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Abstract 
 
Intentional and unintentional radiofrequency interference (i.e., jamming) can result in 
degraded navigation accuracy or complete loss of the GNSS signal tracking. Jammers can be 
classified into three broad categories: Narrowband Jammers (NBJ), Spread Spectrum Jammers 
(SSJ) and Wideband Gaussian Jammers (WGJ). In recent years, a number of effective 
jamming detection and anti-jamming (filtering and suppression) techniques have been 
developed for military GNSS applications and some of them are envisaged to be used for civil 
purposes (e.g., terrorist attacks). The synergies between these jamming detection techniques 
and our newly developed Avionics-Based Integrity Augmentation (ABIA) system are 
investigated in this paper. In particular, GNSS vulnerability to NBJ, SSJ and WGJ types of 
jamming is analytically described in terms of Jamming to Signal (J/S) tracking thresholds and 
the models for calculating the minimum acceptable aircraft-to-jammer ranges are presented. 
Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed ABIA architecture is capable of performing 
jamming detection and avoidance when GNSS is used as the primary source of navigation 
data. 
 
Keywords:  Global Navigation Satellite System, Jamming, Air Navigation, Integrity 
Augmentation and Trajectory Optimisation. 
 
Introduction 
 
Typically, GNSS signals reach the airborne receivers at very low power, and radiofrequency 
interference can be the result of a number of potential sources including: 
 Unintentional interference in the operating frequency band.  
 Intentional jamming (e.g., premeditated GNSS signal attack including terrorist 
activities and electronic warfare). 
 High-power signals in the adjacent frequency bands. 
 Denial of service and scheduled outages. 
 Natural interference including solar flares. 
The positioning accuracy obtained from the satellite signals is degraded or completely lost due 
to jamming and in turn affects the availability of the system. The current reliance on GNSS 
signals for many safety- and mission-critical tasks raises the issue of electronic warfare 
vulnerability and at the same time safety of other aircraft. Jamming tolerance can be increased 
with smarter processing techniques in the receiver prior to the detection stage. Furthermore, 
the spectral spreading techniques adopted in GNSS receivers mitigate the effect of jamming. 
Although the GPS system is well designed to mitigate any jamming effects, like any radio 
receiver, it can still be jammed. Anti-jamming techniques become essential once the signal 
strength of the interfering signal becomes significant. Considering a sample case of Global 
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Positioning System (GPS) signals, the L1 C/A signal received from the 25 W transmitter with 
a 13 dBiC antenna at a range of 12, 550 miles is in the order of -150 dBW. The impact caused 
by jamming on GNSS detection capability has been deeply studied and analytically described 
[1, 2]. Though a number of effective jamming detection and anti-jamming (filtering and 
suppression) techniques have been developed in the last two decades for military applications, 
only a few methods are available for civil use [3, 4]. A number of systems have been designed 
and implemented to detect jamming such as Jammer Detection and LOCation System (JLOC) 
in the US and GNSS Availability, Accuracy, Reliability and Integrity Assessment for timing 
and Navigation system (GAARDIAN) in UK. Jammers are classified into three broad 
categories: Narrowband Jammers (NBJ), Spread Spectrum Jammers (SSJ) and Wideband 
Gaussian Jammers (WGJ). Typical jamming signals can be classified into four classes: 
 Class I: continuous wave signal. 
 Class II: chirp signal with one saw-tooth function. 
 Class III: chirp signal with multi saw-tooth functions. 
 Class IV: chirp signal with frequency bursts. 
In the majority of cases, jamming signals are transmitted in the L1/E1 band, which are used in 
receivers for civilian applications. These signals can affect all GNSS signals including GPS, 
Galileo, GLObalnaya NAvigatsionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema (GLONASS), BeiDou 
(Compass), Indian Regional Navigational Satellite System (IRNSS) and Quasi-Zenith 
Satellite System (QZSS).  
 
ABIA System 
 
In the case of an avionics navigation system, integrity directly relates to the level of 
confidence that can be placed in the information provided by the on-board system. It includes 
the ability of the navigation system to provide timely and valid warnings to users when the 
system must not be used for the intended operation or phase of flight. Specifically, an avionics 
navigation system is required to deliver an alert of any malfunction (as a result of a set alert 
threshold being exceeded) to users within a given period of time. Avionics-Based or Aircraft-
Based Augmentation System (ABAS) is based on additional information provided by other 
avionic systems. In most cases, the additional avionic systems operate via separate principles 
than the GNSS and, therefore, are not subject to the same sources of error or interference. 
While other available augmentation systems such as Ground Based Augmentation System 
(GBAS) and Satellite-Based Augmentation System (SBAS) address GNSS accuracy, 
integrity, availability and continuity augmentation, the ABAS approach is particularly 
effective in increasing the levels of integrity and accuracy of GNSS in a variety of mission- 
and safety-critical aviation applications. Previous research on Avionics-Based Integrity 
Augmentation (ABIA) demonstrated the potential of this technology to enhance GNSS 
integrity performance in a variety of mission- and safety-critical applications including 
experimental flight test/flight inspection, precision approach and automatic landing [5-7]. An 
advanced ABIA integration scheme was also developed specifically addressing the 
cooperative and non-cooperative Sense-and-Avoid (SAA) functions required in Remotely 
Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) applications [8]. The ABIA system architecture is illustrated 
in Fig. 1. The on-board sensors provide information on the aircraft relevant flight parameters 
to an Integrity Flag Generator (IFG).  Using the available data on GNSS and the relevant 
aircraft flight parameters, integrity signals are generated which are transmitted to the cockpit 
display and also provided as aural warnings to the pilots. These integrity flags are 
subsequently used by a Flight Path Optimisation Module (FPOM). The ABIA system 
addresses both the predictive and reactive nature of GNSS integrity augmentation by 
producing suitable integrity flags (cautions and warnings) in case of predicted/ascertained 
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GNSS data losses or unacceptable signal degradations exceeding the Required Navigation 
Performance (RNP) specified for each phase of flight. Additionally, it provides information to 
the on-board pilot in a manned aircraft or to the RPAS pilot in the Ground Control Station 
(GCS) to avoid further data losses/degradations.    
 
ABIA
Flight Path 
Optimization 
Module (FPOM)
Flight Control 
System
Control Surfaces
GNSS 
Pilot / RPAS GCS
Integrity Flag 
Generator (IFG)
Manned Aircraft/ 
RPAS Sensors
Avionics
Jammer Warning 
System
 
 
Fig. 1: ABIA system architecture. Adapted from [8].  
 
The IFG module generates the Caution Integrity Flag (CIF) and Warning Integrity Flag (WIF) 
alerts. The CIF is a predictive annunciation that the GNSS data delivered to the avionics 
system is going to exceed the RNP thresholds specified for the current and planned flight 
operational tasks (GNSS alert status), while the WIF is a reactive annunciation that the GNSS 
data delivered to the avionics system has exceeded the RNP thresholds specified for the 
current flight operational task (GNSS fault status). The Time-to-Caution (TTC) is defined as 
the minimum time allowed for the caution flag to be provided to the user before the onset of a 
GNSS fault resulting in an unsafe condition and Time-to-Warning (TTW) is the maximum 
time allowed from the moment a GNSS fault resulting in an unsafe condition is detected to the 
moment that the ABIA system provides a warning flag to the user. 
 
ABIA Integrity Flags for Jamming 
 
The main causes of GNSS data degradation or signal losses in aviation applications are 
analytically modeled in [5, 6]. The threshold limits required for the IFG to produce caution 
and warning flags are identified in [7]. The thresholds are set based on the aircraft-satellite 
relative geometry including estimated Horizontal and Vertical Position Error (HPE/VPE), 
radio frequency elements and receiver tracking loops. The Scalar Tracking Loops (STL) 
typically employs Delay Lock Loops (DLL) to track the code phase and Phase Lock Loops 
(PLL) or Frequency Lock Loops (FLL) to track the carrier phase. Current state-of-the-art STL 
also employ combined PLL and FLL for carrier tracking to obtain better results in navigation 
position accuracy and to enhance tracking [5-8]. Currently, Vector Tracking Loops (VTL) are 
also employed, which are based on advanced receiver architectures capable of tracking signals 
in a combined manner [9]. VTL provide the advantages of operating at a lower total carrier 
power to noise ratio (C/N0) and in higher dynamics environments when compare with STL 
logics. A typical GNSS receiver is connected to a GNSS antenna and consists of a RF front 
end, a digital signal processor used to calculate code range, carrier phase and Doppler 
frequencies and to generate the navigational data, and a navigation processor used to calculate 
the Position, Velocity and Time (PVT) solution. The method adopted to determine the CIF 
and WIF thresholds are described in [5, 6]. The link budget of the direct GNSS signals 
received by the aircraft in the presence of atmospheric propagation disturbances is calculated 
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based on C/N0, as well as the applicable radiofrequency interference. In general, the effects of 
GNSS signal jamming are: 
 Jamming affects the GNSS receiver’s     . 
 Signal-to-noise ratio (S/N) decreases. 
 Jamming contributes to multipath effects of GNSS signals in dense urban areas.  
 When jamming exists, GNSS receivers might react differently from the ideal case. 
The relationship between effective carrier-to-noise ratio (C/N) and jammer signal power (J) is 
given by [10]: 
 
 
            
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
                                                         (1) 
where    is the thermal noise power spectral density,    is the P-code chipping rate, S is the 
signal power received at the GNSS antenna input, C is the carrier power and J/S is the 
jamming-to-signal ratio. In the general method, range to the jammer, atmospheric losses, and 
a corresponding noise in the jammer are computed, all as a function of time along the 
trajectory. Jamming is modelled based on the J/S levels. The J/S performance of a GNSS 
receiver at its tracking threshold can be evaluated by the following equation [11]: 
 
 
               
    
 
  
 
           
    
 
  
 
                               (2) 
where   is the processing gain adjustment factor and is equal to 1 for Narrowband Jammers 
(NBJ), 1.5 for Spread Spectrum Jammers (SSJ) and 2 for Wideband Gaussian Jammers 
(WGJ),    is the code chipping rate (chips/s) and           is the receiver tracking 
threshold (dB-Hz). Since the weak limit in an avionics receiver is the carrier tracking loop 
threshold, this threshold is usually substituted for          . During the flight test activities 
performed on TORNADO-IDS with unaided C/A code avionics receivers, it was found that in 
all dynamics conditions explored and in the absence of jamming, a (      of 25 dB-Hz was 
sufficient to keep tracking the satellites. As an example, using this 25 dB-Hz tracking 
threshold, we can calculate the J/S performance of the TORNDO-IDS GPS receiver 
considering one of the satellites tracked during the descent and during this manoeuvre, the 
C/N0 for Pseudo Random Noise (PRN) PRN-14 was about 37 dB-Hz. Table 1 shows the 
corresponding J/S calculations, assuming           = 25 dB-Hz.  
 
Table 1: J/S calculations for 25 dB-Hz tracking threshold 
 
Jamming Q                    (      J/S 
NBJ 1 1.023*     25 dB-Hz 37 34.82 
SSJ 1.5 1.023*     25 dB-Hz 37 36.58 
WGJ 2 1.023*     25 dB-Hz 37 37.83 
 
The transmitted power of the jammer and its distance with respect to the GNSS receiver 
required for jamming is expressed in terms of Effective Radiated Power (ERP). Using these 
J/S values, the minimum range in metres from a jamming source can be calculated from: 
     
  
  
  
                    
                                               (3) 
where       is the effective radiated power of the jammer (dBw), j is the wavelength of 
jammer frequency (m),    is the received (incident) jamming power level at threshold = J/S + 
    (dBw),     is the minimum received (incident) signal power (dBw),     is the GNSS 
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antenna gain towards the jammer (dBiC) and     is the jammer power attenuation due to 
recover front-end filtering (dB). The PLL, FLL and DLL error models described in [6] allow 
determining the      corresponding to the receiver tracking thresholds. The integrity flag 
criterion applicable to the ABIA system is [7, 8]:    
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where           is the minimum      for PLL tracking,          is the minimum      
for FLL tracking,          is the minimum      for DLL tracking,              is the 
minimum      for combined PLL and FLL tracking and          is the minimum      for 
VTL based tracking. In general, when the PLL loop order is made higher, there is an 
improvement in dynamic stress performance.  Therefore, third order PLL are widely adopted 
in avionics GNSS receivers. Assuming 15 to 18 Hz noise bandwidth and 5 to 20 msec pre 
detection integration time (typical values for avionics receivers), the tracking threshold for the 
PLL gives 25 to 28 dB-Hz. The main error associated with a GNSS receiver FLL are the 
dynamics stress error and frequency jitter caused due to thermal noise. The receiver tracking 
threshold is adopted such that the 3-sigma jitter must not exceed one-fourth of the frequency 
pull-in range of the FLL discriminator. Using theoretical and experimental threshold values, 
the receiver J/S performance for the various cases of practical interest are calculated. When 
available, flight test data collected in representative portions of the aircraft operational flight 
envelope shall be used. The criteria for generating CIF and WIF based on J/N ratio is 
described in earlier research [5-7, 11-12]. Considering an additional 5% margin on the 3-
sigma tracking thresholds for the CIF, the following detailed criteria are introduced for the 
ABIA integrity thresholds: 
 When either                
                                  
         the CIF shall be generated. 
 When either         
 or            or          the WIF shall be generated. 
The processing of GNSS signals in a receiver specific to anti-jamming function is illustrated 
in Fig. 2. Interference detection is typically performed based on a number of receiver 
parameters including output power, variance and standard deviation of the output power 
(correlated), carrier phase uncertainty and Automatic Gain Control (AGC) values. The key 
component to detect interference in the received signal is the Automatic Gain Control (AGC). 
In order to minimize the signal loss, the amplitude of the received GNSS signal is tuned to the 
ADC range. The gain in AGC drops significantly when there is an increased power in the 
GNSS bandwidth. The chirp signals are predominantly used for jamming in the recent times. 
Chirp signals are typically sinusoidal or cosine signals with sweeping of frequency within in-
band GNSS frequency ranges. The chirp signals are modelled using a periodic Frequency 
Modulated (FM) signal and can be expressed as [12, 13]: 
                     
  
 
 
              
          
  
 
 
         
          (5) 
where     
          is the 1
st
 saw tooth function,     
         is the n
th
 saw tooth 
function,     is the sweep time. A number of algorithms have been proposed for jamming 
detection, localisation and characterisation of interfering signals. Considering a GNSS jammer 
transmitting chirp signals (with zero mean) from a random position, the received signal can be 
expressed as: 
             
 
      
                                                     (6) 
where       is the transmitted jammer signal,    is the carrier signal,   is the distance between 
the jammer and the reciver,   is the path loss and c is the speed of light. In order to improve 
the hostile effects of GNSS in electronic warfare and terrorist attacks, new generation signals 
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are being introduced. These signals inherently possess higher precision of orientation and anti-
jamming performance, and are also compatible existing GNSS signals. Binary Offset Carrier 
(BOC) modulation is introduced to increase the ERP for anti-jamming performance without 
affecting the existing GNSS signals. In these cases, Costas loop is used as carrier tracking 
loop to receive BOC modulated signals. When a jamming signal interferes with the GNSS 
signal, phase measurement error increases beyond a specified threshold value and as a 
consequence the tracking loop loses lock.   
GNSS signal 
reception
(L1/E1 band)
Down conversion 
to intermediate 
frequency
High speed 
processing
Gain shaping 
algorithms 
Optimisation of 
power and phase 
of the signals
Conversion to 
GNSS signal 
frequencies
 
 
Fig. 2:  GNSS receiver processing for anti-jamming function 
 
The design of the GNSS antenna generally provides a superior polarisation signal reception 
and poor low elevation angle gain. As a result of superior polarisation, cross polarisation 
reception is less than -10dBic and thus effectively reduces unwanted signal reflections. In 
order to design GNSS receivers against interference, bandwidth, sampling and hardware 
considerations are taken into account. In order to increase the accuracy of the signal, narrow 
correlator spacing is employed by sharpening up the auto correlation function. Therefore, it is 
ensured that the correlators are still operating in a linear range. Noise increases due to the 
increase in pre-correlation bandwidth but it can effectively tackled by employing superior 
digital signal processing algorithms. Generally, the signal processor adopted has the capability 
of performing code correlation in two different modes:  an early-minus-late power mode and a 
dot-product mode. The signal processor has two correlators in each channel and can operate 
one of the correlators as an early or an early-minus-late correlator. The normalised dot-
product discriminator is given by [14]: 
   
             
  
    
                                                        (7) 
where I and Q values are summed over the Prediction Integration Interval (PDI).      and 
     represent the I and Q values when the hardware in implemented in the dot-product mode. 
P stands for I and Q and are similar to the ones used in carrier loop discriminators. For an 
infinite pre-correlation bandwidth, the normalised Early-minus-Late (EL) discriminator has an 
output at high values of SNR and the estimation is given by: 
      
       
          
 chips, -d/2≤   ≤ d/2                                    (8) 
where   is the tracking error and   is the EL discriminator spacing in chips. The standard 
deviation of the pseudorange observations (    is estimated from the discriminator output 
standard deviation (    and is given by: 
   
    
  
                                                              (9) 
where    is the gain of the discriminator and   is the bandwidth. For example, for a loop 
bandwisth of 1/30 Hz, the resulting    is approximately 0.3 cycles. In avionics receivers, lock 
detectors are used to assess if the satellite signals are being tracked or not tracked. Code lock 
detection is adopted, which is very similar to estimating the received     , inferring that the 
  
16
th
 Australian Aerospace Congress, 23-24 February 2015, Melbourne 
 
receiver is operating on or near the correlation peak. The code-correlation process of the 
receiver is designed to increase the signal strength when compared to that of inherent and 
added noise. The spread spectrum processing gain (  ) is defined as the ratio of the spread 
bandwidth to the unspread (baseband) bandwidth and is expressed in dB. The post-correlation 
    is given as: 
                                                                         (10) 
When the receiver code is aligned with the transmitted code, the signal power at the band pass 
output is crushed into approximately 100 Hz of bandwidth. The processing gain can be 
calculated from: 
              
   
  
                                                              (11) 
where    is the chipping rate and    is the data period.  For the C/A code this works out to be 
about 43 dB.  Typical avionics receivers have a cut off value at 10 dB, which means that if the 
value is less than this the satellite signal level is too low to be used in the positioning 
computations [14]. An additional threshold criterion to be accounted for in the ABIA system 
is given as: 
                                                                             (12) 
 When    is more than 11 dB (margin of 1 dB), the CIF shall be generated. 
 When    is less than 9 dB (margin of 1 dB), the WIF shall be generated. 
 
Avoidance of Jamming Environment 
 
A number of jamming mitigation techniques are normally adopted as counteract measures. 
The adoption of filters to fade out the jamming signal is usually employed. Specifically, a 
notch filter (narrowband band stop filter) is used against continuous wave or narrowband 
electronic attacks. Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Modules (SAASM) are employed by 
the US DoD for tackling spoofing of GNSS signals. Controlled Radiation Pattern Antenna 
(CPRA) offering null steering is often bulky and expensive. Multi-constellation / multi-
frequency receivers including the ones using embedded Software Defined Radio (SDR) based 
processing are used for tackling jamming. An analysis of the identified degradation results in 
inferring that a common criterion based on satellite elevation variation in the body frame can 
be adopted. Depending upon the technique used to capture the jammer’s coordinates, the 
targeting error represents approximately half of the final Circular Error Probable (CEP). 
Earlier methods to overcome jamming adopted the integration of GNSS with other navigation 
sensors; say Inertial Navigation System (INS) sensors [10]. When it is detected that the 
tracking loop (PLL/FLL/DLL/VTL) has lost lock in a jamming environment, the GNSS signal 
is decoupled from the integrated navigation system and then guidance for avoidance trajectory 
is obtained from the calibrated INS operating in a coast mode. Generally, in a tightly coupled 
architecture, the GNSS data is used to aid the navigation solution, and the INS is used to 
remove the majority of the error from the signal input to the GPS tracking loops. The amount 
of Doppler error that can be removed is determined from the accuracy of the navigation 
solution, and further, by the dynamics of the manned aircraft/RPAS. If the integrated 
navigation solution is more accurate, then the error is drastically reduced and the receiver loop 
bandwidth is reduced leading to the susceptibility to jammer noise. The GPS carrier tracking 
loop is more susceptible to jamming due to the small wavelength of the carrier (0.19 metres) 
compared to the P-code chip width (29.3 meters). One method of detecting carrier loop lock is 
to monitor the detected phase error estimate (u) in the PLL and is expressed as [10]: 
Track quality indicator = cos 2u                                               (13) 
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The threshold of the loop is dynamically altered according to the computed S/N ratio and it is 
assumed that a loss of lock is evident when the signal strength falls below a fixed threshold. In 
order to compute the signal generated for input to the tracking loops, noise due to bot thermal 
and jammer sources is superimposed on the signals. Noise is generally assumed to be 
Gaussian in nature and its power is obtained from C/N value and the noise power is given by: 
Noise power =       (C/N)                                                    (14) 
where    is the recived satellite signal power and   is the prediction bandwidth. The design of 
avoiding jamming environment by adopting ABIA system involves the evaluation of the 
overall avoidance volume. The overall avoidance volume is obtained by combining the 
avoidance volume resulting from the jammer and uncertainty volume resulting from positional 
deviations. Extended Kalman Filter (EKF), Unscented Kalman Filter (UKF) or particle filter 
is used for multi-sensor data fusion of different navigation sensors to obtain the Position, 
Velocity and Attitude (PVA) estimates. Pseudo-spectral optimisation (PSO) or constrained 
Differential Geometric Optimization (DGO) techniques are used to generate the new 
trajectory based on the available time to conflict (host manned aircraft/RPAS entering the 
jamming avoidance volume). The shape of the combined jamming avoidance volume and 
navigation errors is described using spherical harmonics. Depending on if the errors are 
statistically independent or dependent; the resultant volume is obtained for uncorrelated or 
correlated errors respectively [16-19]. The selection of the optimal trajectory from the 
generated set of safe trajectories is based on minimisation of the following cost function: 
                                                       (15) 
where      is the estimated distance of the generated avoidance trajectory points from the 
avoidance volume associated with the obstacle,                is the estimated minimum 
distance of the avoidance trajectory from the avoidance volume,               is the time at 
which the safe avoidance condition is successfully attained,      
  
 
    is the specific fuel 
consumption,      is the thrust profile, and               are the weightings attributed to 
time, fuel, distance and integral distance respectively. In time-critical avoidance applications 
(i.e., closing-up on jamming environments at high relative velocities especially for military 
aircraft) appropriate higher weightings are used for the time and distance cost elements.   
Based on the criteria identified for integrity monitoring and augmentation, the jamming 
environment represented by the radiation pattern is avoided by initiating avoidance 
manoeuvres obtained from the FPOM. In order to constrain the trajectory optimization 
process, dynamic constraint criteria are adopted. 
                  
Simulation Cases 
 
Simulation case studies to evaluate the performance of the proposed GNSS ABIA integrity  
augmentation strategy were performed in a number of test platforms (3-DoF and 6-DoF 
aircraft dynamics models) including AIRBUS 320 (A320), TORNADO-IDS and  
AEROSONDE RPAS. In all scenarios including multipath environments [15], an overall 
avoidance volume is generated based on the SAA Unified Method (SUM) proposed in [19]. 
An avoidance trajectory is generated based on the available time to conflict using PSO or 
DGO techniques. Time and fuel are used in the cost functional, the aircraft dynamics model 
produces the dynamics constraints, and the satellite elevation criteria are used to set path 
constraints for both PSO and DGO techniques [5]. Based on the obtained position uncertainty 
about the host manned aircraft or RPAS trajectory, an optimised avoidance trajectory without 
any GNSS data losses is constructed around the overall avoidance volume obtained by 
combining the jamming signal radiation pattern and navigation error of the host platform. The 
optimised avoidance trajectory is constructed tangential to the radiation pattern of the jammer 
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(main lobe in the case of directional jammer). The optimised avoidance trajectory obtained in 
the presence of directional and non-directional jammers is illustrated in Fig. 5 and 6 
respectively. 
Directional
Jammer
Main Lobe 
Aircraft Trajectory
Position
Uncertainty
Side Lobes 
 
Fig.5: Optimised avoidance trajectory in the presence of directional jammer 
 
Non-directional
Jammer
Aircraft Trajectory
Position
Uncertainty
 
Fig.6: Optimised avoidance trajectory in the presence of non-directional jammer 
 
A simulation run performed in MATLAB
TM
 and Simulink for the directional jammer case is 
also illustrated in Fig. 7. The AEROSONDE RPAS 6-DoF dynamics model was used for this 
simulation run. After the conflict detection and resolution was determined with respect to the 
jamming radiation pattern, the avoidance trajectory was generated and optimized based on the 
cost function defined earlier. Additionally, the constraints imposed by ABIA in terms of 
RPAS platform dynamics and GNSS constellation satellite elevation angles were considered 
to generate the optimised avoidance trajectory and thus preventing degradation or losses of 
navigation data during the whole jammer avoidance loop. 
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Fig.7: Trajectory in the presence of directional jammer 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this research the effects of jamming on GNSS integrity augmentation performance were 
examined. The analytical models of Jamming-to-Signal (J/S) tracking thresholds for different 
types of jamming were described. In particular, the models for calculating the minimum 
acceptable aircraft-to-jammer ranges and the determination of the overall avoidance volume 
were presented. Simulation case studies conducted in the presence of directional and non-
directional jammers demonstrated the capability of the on-board ABIA system to avoid 
jamming. Further research is focussing on the ABIA evolutions for Next Generation Flight 
Management System (NG-FMS) applications [20-23] as well as trajectory optimization for 
future CNS+A systems and 4 Dimensional Trajectory (4DT) Intent Based Operations (IBO).  
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